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Abstract
This Article will focus on the question of exclusive competence in the field of EU external
relations, especially in the light of recent developments. After a brief discussion on the origins and
development of exclusive competence, a distinction will be made between common commercial
policy, which has traditionally been the most important area of an explicit “a priori” exclusive
competence, and what is often called an implicit exclusive competence, which, as it is today based
on some general criteria enshrined in TFEU Article 3(2), may be called “supervening” exclusive
competence. With regard to both categories, the main focus will be on recent developments,
notably the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced the TFEU and its Articles 2 and 3, as
well as the case law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”) following the entry
into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on December 1, 2009.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the features which distinguishes the European Union
from intergovernmental organizations is the fact that the European
Union, in some areas, has so-called exclusive competence, excluding
a parallel competence for its Member States.1 According to Article
2(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(“TFEU”),2 “[w]hen the Treaties confer on the Union exclusive
competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt
legally binding acts, the Member States being able to do so
themselves only if so empowered by the Union or for the
implementation of Union acts.”
As can be seen from TFEU Article 3, the exclusive competence
also exists with regard to EU external relations, that is, the treaty and
other relations of the European Union with third states. Article 3(1)

* Judge at the European Court of Justice. Dr.Jur., Dr.Jur. h.c., Dr.Pol.Sc. h.c. Senior
Fellow of the University of Turku, Visiting Professor, College of Europe and University of
Helsinki.
1. On the differences in competence and powers between the EU and intergovernmental
organizations in general, see ALLAN ROSAS & LORNA ARMATI, EU CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
AN INTRODUCTION 15-17 (2d rev. ed. 2012).
2. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 2,
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
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provides for “a priori exclusivity”3 in the following areas: (a) customs
union; (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the
functioning of the internal market; (c) monetary policy for the
Member States whose currency is the euro; (d) the conservation of
marine biological resources under the common fisheries policy; and
(e) common commercial policy. Points (d) and (e) especially are
highly relevant in the context of EU external relations. Article 3(2),
for its part, adds to the categories of exclusive external competence
three general criteria for determining whether the conclusion of an
international agreement falls under an exclusive competence even if
the agreement does not belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 3(1).
The question of exclusive competence should be seen in the
broader context of the competence and powers of the European Union
in external relations and its treaty relations with third states in
particular. If an EU competence is not exclusive, it is in most cases
shared with the Member States.4 Agreements concluded under a
shared competence usually become mixed, which means that they will
be open for conclusion by not only the European Union but also its
Member States. In addition, EU Member States continue to conclude
international agreements in their own names, without the participation
of the European Union as a contracting party, including sometimes on
matters which belong to an EU exclusive or shared competence.
One should thus distinguish between the following three
categories of international agreements: (1) agreements concluded by
the European Union alone; (2) agreements concluded by the European
Union and one or more of its Member States (mixed agreements); and
(3) agreements concluded by one or more Member States.
Agreements concluded by the EU, including mixed agreements, are
binding upon both the EU institutions and the Member States.5 Whilst
the agreements concluded by Member States without formal EU
participation are, in principle, part of the national law of the Member
States that have concluded them and are not part of EU law, such
agreements may become relevant for EU law purposes as well,

3. Alan Dashwood, Mixity in the Era of the Treaty of Lisbon, in MIXED AGREEMENTS
REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE WORLD 351, 356 (Christophe Hillion &
Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010).
4. See, e.g., Dashwood, supra note 3.
5. TFEU, supra note 2, art. 216(2), 2010 O.J. C 83, at 144.
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especially if the agreement in question concerns matters falling under
an EU competence.6
The practical importance of the distinction between exclusive
and shared competence should not be exaggerated.7 Even in an area of
exclusive competence, the European Union may be barred from
becoming a party to an international convention or member of an
international organization by an adherence clause that is limited to
Member States. In such situations and some others, the European
Union may have to authorize the Member States to act in the interest
of the Union. In areas of shared competence, again, the so-called duty
of cooperation may require that the EU institutions and the Member
States act jointly, and may in some instances prevent the Member
States from acting alone.8
Yet, the question of whether the European Union can act alone,
notably in concluding international agreements, or whether Member
States’ participation is allowed or called for, does have significance
both in theory and in practice—not only for the relations between the
European Union and its Member States, but also for its relations with
third states. The latter will normally prefer EU agreements to mixed
agreements, wishing to avoid the complexities and uncertainties
stemming from mixed agreements—who, on the EU side, is
responsible for what?9
This Article will focus on the question of exclusive competence
in the field of EU external relations, especially in the light of recent
developments. After a brief discussion on the origins and
development of exclusive competence, a distinction will be made
between common commercial policy, which has traditionally been the
most important area of an explicit “a priori” exclusive competence,
and what is often called an implicit exclusive competence, which, as
it is today based on some general criteria enshrined in TFEU Article
3(2), may be called “supervening” exclusive competence.10 With
regard to both categories, the main focus will be on recent
6. Allan Rosas, The Status in EU Law of International Agreements Concluded by EU
Member States, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1304, 1310 (2011).
7. See Allan Rosas, Exclusive, Shared and National Competence in the Context of EU
External Relations: Do Such Distinctions Matter?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WORLD:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MARC MARESCEAU 17 (Inge Govaere et al. eds., 2013).
8. See Commission v. Sweden, Case C-246/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-03317.
9. See Peter Olson, Mixity from the Outside: The Perspective of a Treaty Partner, in
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 3, at 331.
10. See Dashwood, supra note 3, at 360.
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developments, notably the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon,11 which
introduced the TFEU and its Articles 2 and 3, as well as the case law
of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ” or the “Court”)12 following
the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, on December 1, 2009.
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
The idea that the European Union may in certain areas of
external relations have an exclusive competence is no novelty. As the
aims of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic
Community included the creation of a customs union as well as an
internal market, it became almost inevitable to provide for a common
commercial policy as well. What are today TFEU Articles 206–207
on common commercial policy were included already in a different
form in Articles 110–116 of the original Treaty of Rome. A common
customs tariff was established during the 1960s while some import
restrictions maintained by individual Member States were abolished
only much later.13
In an Opinion of 1975, the ECJ for the first time explicitly
confirmed that the common commercial policy belonged to the area
of exclusive competence.14 After having considered that export credits
are covered by the notion of export policy and more generally by the
common commercial policy, the Court held that in the field of export
credits, accepting a concurrent competence of the Member States
would distort competition between undertakings of the various
Member States and would, inter alia, prevent the Community “from
fulfilling its task in the defence of the common interest.”15 In
subsequent case law, the Court, as far as the trade in goods is
concerned, confirmed its fairly broad understanding of the concept of
common commercial policy, including various sorts of restrictions or
11. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter
Treaty of Lisbon].
12. The Court of Justice of the European Union, according to Article 19 of the Treaty on
European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter “TEU”], includes the Court of Justice, the
General Court, and specialized courts.
13. PIET EECKHOUT, EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 11-13 (2d ed. 2011). On the
origins of the notion of common commercial policy as an exclusive competence, see MOSHE
KANIEL, THE EXCLUSIVE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY UP TO
THE PERIOD OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT 17-19, 67-79 (1996).
14. Opinion 1/75, Understanding on a Local Cost Standard, [1975] E.C.R. 1355.
15. Id. at 1364.
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regulations such as technical, sanitary and other barriers to trade,
export credits, and tariff preferences in favor of developing
countries.16 The question as to whether also to include the trade in
services and the trade aspects of intellectual property rights, as well as
the question of the borderline between trade in goods and measures
affecting trade but having non-trade objectives, will be considered
below.
Whilst the common commercial policy has from the beginning
been based on an explicit Treaty provision—although the exclusive
nature of that competence was, perhaps, not crystal clear before
Opinion 1/75—the ECJ already was faced in 1971 with the question
as to whether the Community’s external competence could also be
founded on considerations other than an explicit Treaty provision to
that effect. In what has become known as the AETR/ERTA judgment
(after the European Agreement Concerning the Work of Crews of
Vehicles Engaged in International Road Transport), the Court held
that a competence to conclude international agreements may not only
arise from an explicit provision to that effect in the Treaties but may
“equally flow from other provisions of the Treaty and from measures
adopted . . . by the Community institutions.”17 This assertion of
competence was immediately followed by an assertion of exclusive
competence, sometimes referred to as an “implicit” exclusive
competence. The Court famously held that each time the Community,
with a view to implementing a common policy envisaged by the
Treaty, adopts provisions laying down common rules, “the Member
States no longer have the right, acting individually or even
collectively, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect
those rules.”18
The AETR/ERTA approach was supplemented in 1976 by
another principle formulating an implied competence in the external
field. In Opinion 1/76 the ECJ held that there may be a Community
competence to conclude an international agreement even if an internal
competence had not yet been exercised and thus no Community
16. See, e.g., Opinion 1/78, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 1979
EU:C:1979:224 (which concluded, on the other hand, that Member States’ participation in a
financing scheme would imply a mixed agreement); Case C-45/86, Comm’n v. Council, 1987
EU:C:1987:163; Case C-62/88, Greece v. Council (“Chernobyl”), 1990 EU:C:1990:153; see
also EECKHOUT, supra note 13, 18-25.
17. Case C-22/70, Comm’n v. Council, 1971 EU:C:1971:32, ¶ 16; see also, e.g.,
EECKHOUT, supra note 13, 71-82.
18. Comm’n v. Council, ¶ 17.
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legislation adopted, namely if that was “necessary” for the attainment
of a specific Treaty objective and that objective could not be attained
by adopting internal measures.19 There has been disagreement as to
whether the Court by this so-called 1/76 dictum intended to assert an
exclusive competence, or whether it was merely a confirmation of the
fact that in some instances, the Community could exercise an external
competence even if the substantive competence had not yet been
exercised internally.20 Today the 1/76 dictum is expressed in TFEU
Article 3(2) and it is thus beyond doubt that it may constitute a
ground for an exclusive competence. Its precise scope and content
remain to be clarified by the ECJ or otherwise.
As to the common fishery policy, the ECJ in 1976 held that as a
combined effect of Treaty provisions on the common agricultural
policy, regulations adopted by the Council, and a provision of the Act
of Accession of 1973—when Denmark, Ireland, and the United
Kingdom acceded to the Communities—the Community had acquired
a competence to enter into international commitments for the
conservation of the resources of the sea.21 As the provision of the Act
of Accession, according to which the Council had an obligation to
determine conditions for fishing, with the view to ensuring protection
of fishing grounds and conservation of the biological resources of the
sea, became applicable on January 1, 1979, the Court in a case
decided in 1981 held that the Member States were “no longer entitled
to exercise any power of their own in the matter of conservation
measures in the waters under their jurisdiction”22 and that the
competence has thus become “exclusive.”23 This development may be
seen as a combination of the explicit Treaty-based competence
approach and the “implicit” competence introduced by the
AETR/ERTA judgment.
In the following, I shall focus on the subsequent developments
first, of the common commercial policy, and then, of the AETR/ERTA
19. Opinion 1/76, European Lay-Up Fund for Inland Waterways Vessels, 1977
EU:C:1977:63, ¶¶ 2-5.
20. See, e.g., Piet Eeckhout, Exclusive External Competences: Constructing the EU as
an International Actor, in THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE: ANALYSES AND PERSPECTIVES ON SIXTY YEARS OF CASELAW, 611 at 628-30 (2012); EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 76-82.
21. Kramer and Others, Joined Cases 3, 4, & 6/76, EU:C:1976:114, ¶ 33; see also Case
C-32/79, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 1980 EU:C:1980:189.
22. Case C-804/79, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 1981 EU:C:1981:93, ¶ 18.
23. Id. ¶ 27.
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principle, while leaving aside other situations or contexts where an
exclusive competence could arise, such as the “necessity” criterion
first launched in Opinion 1/76, the common fisheries policy, or some
other grounds for an exclusive competence now recognized in TFEU
Article 3(1)—for instance, monetary policy. The common
commercial policy and the AETR/ERTA principle have been chosen
because it is in these two contexts that recent developments in Treaty
law and case law have brought new elements to the debate about
exclusive external competence.
II. COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY
As explained above, the ECJ already at an early stage adopted a
fairly broad understanding of what constitutes trade in goods and thus
falls under the common commercial policy. In Opinion 1/94,24 the
Court confirmed that not only the General Agreement on Tarriffs and
Trade (“GATT”), but also all the multilateral agreements on trade in
goods provided for in Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) of 1994,25 fall
under the common commercial policy and thus belong to the sphere
of exclusive competence. There also appeared indications in the
Court’s case law that measures regulating international trade may
belong to the sphere of exclusive competence even if they pursue
other ultimate objectives (development, environment, political
objectives, and so on).26 On the other hand, some later decisions are
based on the idea that measures affecting trade may escape the realm
of common commercial policy if the predominant objectives and
components of the agreement are to be seen elsewhere, notably in the
protection of the environment.27

24. Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement, 1994 EU:C:1994:384.
25. 1994 O.J. L 336/3.
26. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, Les relations internationales commerciales de l’Union
européenne – Un aperçu juridique et développements actuels, in LIBER AMICORUM BENGT
BROMS: CELEBRATING HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY 16 OCTOBER 1999 428, 430-433 (Finnish Branch
of the Int’l L. Ass’n, 1999).
27. See, e.g., Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, [2001] E.C.R. I-9713, ¶ 40; Case C94/03, Comm'n v. Council, [1996] E.C.R. I-01; Case C-411/06, Comm'n v. Parliament and
Council, [2009] E.C.R. I-7585, ¶ 71; cf. Comm’n v. Council (“Energy Star”), [2002] E.C.R. I12049 (where the Court held the commercial policy objective was predominant and that the
agreement in question fell under an exclusive competence); see also EECKHOUT, supra note
13, at 39-57.
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As to trade in services services and the trade aspects of
intellectual property rights, the ECJ, in Opinion 1/94, famously ruled
that matters dealt with in the WTO General Agreement on Trade in
Services (“GATS”)28 and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”)29 fell, as a general rule,
outside the realm of common commercial policy and thus exclusive
competence. While after this Opinion a pragmatic way of dealing
with WTO matters was found, giving the Commission the task of
representing the Community and its Member States also in GATS and
TRIPS contexts—albeit based on previous coordination between the
Commission and the Member States,30 the formal distinction between
exclusive (GATT) and shared competence (GATS and TRIPS)
continued to be a source of uncertainty and concern,31 and various
initiatives were taken to bring the latter under the umbrella of
common commercial policy.
One such effort was made in the context of the Treaty of Nice of
2001, which amended, inter alia, the EC Treaty, including its then
Article 133 relating to common commercial policy. Whilst Article
133(5), as amended, provided that the conclusion of international
agreements in the fields of trade in services and the trade-related
aspects of intellectual property rights fell under paragraphs one to
four of the same Article, in other words under the common
commercial policy—and thus an exclusive competence, this was said
to be “without prejudice” to paragraph six. And Article 133(6) stated
that trade in certain sensitive service sectors (cultural and audiovisual
services, educational services, and social and human health services)
continued to fall under a shared competence and required joint
conclusion by the Community and its Member States and added that
28. 1994 O.J. (L 336) 190; see Case C-360/93, Parliament v. Council, [1996], E.C.R. I11954, where the Court, by referring to Opinion 1/94, observed that only services which are
supplied across frontiers fall within the scope of the common commercial policy (¶ 29) and
annulled the decision to conclude an agreement on public procurement as it had been based on
Article 113 of the EC Treaty (now TFEU Article 207) alone.
29. 1994 O.J. (L 336) 213.
30. See, e.g., Joni Heliskoski, Joint Competence of the European Community and its
Member States and the Dispute Settlement Practice of the World Trade Organization, 2
CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. L. 61 (1999).
31. As TRIPS was considered to fall under a shared competence, the ECJ was in many
cases confronted with the question of the division of competence between the Community and
the Member States in order to ascertain which parts of the Agreement formed part of
Community law. See, e.g., Case C-431/05, Merck Genéricos - Produtos Farmacêuticos Lda v.
Merck & Co. Inc., [2007] E.C.R. I-7001.
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transport agreements continued to fall under some other parts of the
Treaty—not providing for any explicit exclusive competence.
In Opinion 1/08, given the day before the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon, containing yet another version of Article 133 (now
TFEU Article 207), the ECJ refuted the thesis of the Commission and
the European Parliament according to which the exception contained
in Article 133(6) only concerned agreements which exclusively or
predominantly covered the services belonging to the sensitive sectors
listed in Article 133(6). The Court also confirmed that the transport
aspects of such an agreement were not covered by Article 133 at all.32
The conclusion of the agreements made in the context of GATS thus
fell within the sphere of shared competence of the Community and its
Member States.
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty changed the legal
landscape in a significant manner. The former Article 133 of the EC
Treaty became TFEU Article 207, and its first paragraph now lists
measures relating not only to trade in goods but also to trade in
services as well as the commercial aspects of intellectual property.
What is more, “foreign direct investment” is mentioned as well. It
thus became clear that these areas are included in the concept of
common commercial policy and thus are covered by TFEU Article
3(1)(e), providing for an exclusive competence in the area of
“common commercial policy.”
That this new provision did not settle all possible disagreements
to which the question of the exact scope of the common commercial
policy could give rise became clear in the context of a request for a
preliminary ruling submitted to the ECJ in 2011. The national (Greek)
judge wanted to know whether a provision of TRIPS (Article 27)
setting out the framework for patent protection fell within an area for
which the Member States continued to have primary competence—in
which case they would have been free to decide on the possible direct
effect of the provision in question—and also put some questions
relating to the interpretation of this and another provision of TRIPS.33
The Court answered the first question in the negative, concluding that
32. Opinion 1/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-11129, concerned the conclusion of agreements on the
grant of compensation for modification and withdrawal of certain GATS commitments
following the accession of new Member States to the EU.
33. Case C-414/11, Daiichi Sankyo v. DEMO, [2013] E.C.R. I-___ (delivered July 18,
2013), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=139744
&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=821637.
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TRIPS Article 27 “falls within the field of the common commercial
policy.”
This conclusion must be seen in the context of the arguments put
before the Court by a number of Member States. They argued that the
question should be approached in the context of the case law of the
Court relating to mixed agreements, implying that there was an EU
competence only to the extent that the European Union had exercised
its powers and adopted provisions to implement the agreement. This
was because the majority of the rules of TRIPS, such as those
concerning patentability, should be considered as concerning
international trade only indirectly, and hence as falling outside the
field of common commercial policy. The Court disagreed, observing,
inter alia, that TFEU Article 207 differed noticeably from Article 133
of the EC Treaty, that Opinions 1/94 and 1/08 were no longer
relevant, that TRIPS, being as it is an integral part of the WTO
system,34 has a specific link with international trade, and also that the
terms used in TFEU Article 207(1) “correspond almost literally” to
the very title of TRIPS.35
Whilst this judgment should by now have settled the question of
the status of TRIPS, there may be other issues to clarify in the future
concerning the precise scope of TFEU Article 270(1), such as the
question of other international agreements relating to the protection of
intellectual property rights or the definition of “foreign direct
investment.”36 Moreover, Article 207(5) repeats the exclusion of
transport services, which shall continue to be subject to the transport
part of the TFEU (Title VI of Part Three).
As to trade in services in general, a case brought by the
European Commission against the EU Council in 2012 and decided
by the ECJ in the following year concerned the delimitation of acts
having a specific link to international trade from acts relating to the
EU internal market.37 It is notable that in this case the parties did not
contest that the international trade in services falls under TFEU
Article 207. The Council, contrary to the proposal of the Commission,
had decided that the legal basis of the decision to sign a Council of
34. In this context, the Court also observed that under the WTO system, there may be
“cross-suspension” of concessions between TRIPS and the other WTO multilateral
agreements. Id. ¶ 54.
35. Id. ¶ 55.
36. See, e.g., EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 63-64; Eeckhout, supra note 20, at 624-25;
Rosas, supra note 7, at 21-22.
37. See generally Case C-137/12, Comm’n. v. Council, 2013 EU:C:2013:675.
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Europe Convention relating to the legal protection of radio, television
and information society services based on conditional access (access
subject to prior individual authorization) should be TFEU Article 114
relating to the internal market and that the Convention should
accordingly be signed both by the European Union and its Member
States.38 Before the Court, the Council, together with some Member
States, argued that the Convention was primarily intended to
approximate the legislation of the contracting parties and that it thus
concerned the EU internal market and that the fact that the
Convention, unlike EU internal legislation in this field,39 also affected
trade in services between the European Union and third countries,
was of an indirect and secondary nature only. Some Member States
added that the provisions of the Convention relating to seizure and
confiscation were of a criminal-law nature and already for this reason
fell outside the common commercial policy.
The Court rejected this line of argument and annulled the
Council decision. After a detailed analysis of the different provisions
of the Convention, the Court concluded that it was supposed to help
extend the application of EU internal legislation beyond the borders
of the European Union in order to promote the supply of services to
third countries, and that the aspects of the Convention which did not
clearly relate to the international trade in services were of an
incidental or ancillary nature. Hence the contested decision (to sign
the Convention) “primarily” pursued an objective having a “specific
connection to the common commercial policy.” That meant that the
decision should have been based on TFEU Article 207(4) instead of
Article 114 and that the signing of the Convention fell within the
exclusive competence of the European Union.40 The judgment
confirms earlier case law relating to “ancillary” provisions, implying
that it is sufficient for an act to fall under the common commercial
policy and thus EU exclusive competence if its primary objective and
content is to regulate trade with third countries.

38. Unlike the common commercial policy, the internal market is in TFEU Article 4(2)
listed among the areas of shared competence. See Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the
OECD on National Treatment, 1995, EU:C:1995:83 (holding that the OECD rules in question
were partly covered by the Unions internal market rules and not by the rules of its common
commercial policy (¶ IV:25)).
39. Council Directive 98/84, 1998 O.J. (L 320) 54 (EC) (discussing the legal protection
of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access).
40. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 37, ¶ 76.
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III. THE AETR/ERTA PRINCIPLE
As noted above, the ECJ in its AETR/ERTA judgment of 1971
held that each time the Community, with a view to implementing a
common policy envisaged by the Treaty, adopts provisions laying
down common rules, “the Member States no longer have the right,
acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with
third countries which affect those rules.”41 This fairly broad formula
was applied and clarified notably in Opinion 2/91, which, inter alia,
made it clear that the AETR/ERTA principle would also apply to
Community rules which did not “implement a common policy” in the
meaning of the AETR/ERTA judgment itself.42 Moreover, according
to the Opinion, it is not necessary that the area covered by EU
legislation and the international agreement coincide fully as long as
the relevant area is covered “to a large extent” by EU rules. Opinion
2/91, on the other hand, provided for a more restrictive approach to
Community rules which lay down minimum requirements only,
stating that such rules may not be sufficiently “affected” by an
international agreement which itself allows contracting parties to
adopt more stringent measures than the minimum requirements of the
agreement.43
In Opinion 1/94, in which the Court ruled that as Community
law stood in 1994, GATS and TRIPS should be concluded jointly by
the Community and its Member States, the Court also seems to have
applied the AETR/ERTA principle in a somewhat more restrictive
manner.44 True, the Court may even have slightly expanded this
principle in stating that the Community acquires an exclusive
competence not only when it has included in its internal legislation
provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of third states, but
also by the mere fact that internal legislation provides for a power to
negotiate with third states. But when the Court added a third criteria,
referring to a situation where there are no express provisions relating
to third states in Community legislation—the situation which seems
to be at the heart of the AETR/ERTA principle, it spoke of a situation
of “complete harmonization” of the internal rules—as the common
rules thus adopted could be affected within the meaning of the
41. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 17, ¶ 17.
42. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention No. 170, 1993 EU:C:1993:106.
43. Id., ¶¶ 17-21.
44. Opinion 1/94, supra note 24; Cf. EECKHOUT, supra note 13, at 82-95 (arguing that
“the Court left AETR and Opinion 1/76 fully intact”).
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AETR/ERTA judgment.45 Whilst this dictum was made in a GATS
context, with the Court referring to the complete harmonization of
rules “governing access to a self-employed activity,” it has often been
understood as a ruling of more general relevance.
That was at least the interpretation of Opinion 1/94 on this point
put forward in the so-called “Open Skies” judgments of 2002, which
concerned the conformity with EU law of bilateral air transport
agreements concluded by some Member States with the United
States.46 These judgments did establish an exclusive AETR/ERTA
competence but this competence only covered certain concrete issues
(such as air fares) and did not establish an exclusive competence for
air transport agreements in general.
In Opinion 1/03, the Court was called upon to rule on the
relevance of the AETR/ERTA principle for the conclusion of a
multilateral agreement relating to private international law.47 The
Court this time concluded that the new agreement fell “entirely within
the sphere of exclusive competence of the European Community.”48
The following elements should be highlighted: (1) the Court took a
certain distance to the above-mentioned three situations leading to an
exclusive competence set out in Opinion 1/94—and repeated in the
Open Skies judgments of 200249—and now stated that these were
only examples, formulated in the particular contexts with which the
Court was concerned; (2) the Court confirmed a dictum in Opinion
2/91 according to which it is not necessary for the areas covered by
the international agreement and the EU legislation to coincide fully
and that an area which is “already covered to a large extent” by EU
rules may suffice;50 (3) in the latter context, the Court also confirmed
and specified a reference in Opinion 2/91 by observing that it is
necessary to take into account “not only the current state of
Community law in the area in question but also its future
development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that
45. Id. ¶ 96.
46. See, e.g., Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Den., 2002 EU:C:2002:625, ¶ 84. Compare id.,
with ¶ 82, where another formula is used and the other so-called Open Skies judgments
delivered on the same day.
47. The Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, provides for an extension of most of the rules of an
internal EU regulation to some non-member states. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001
of 22 December 2000, 2001 O.J. (L 304) 34.
48. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, 2006 EU:C:2006:81.
49. See Comm’n v. Den., supra note 46, ¶ 45.
50. Opinion 1/03, [2006] E.C.R. I-1198, ¶ 126.
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analysis;”51 (4) the Court further confirmed that initiatives seeking to
avoid contradictions on substance between EU law and the agreement
does not remove the obligation to determine, prior to the conclusion
of the agreement, whether it is capable of affecting the EU rules
within the meaning of the AETR/ERTA principle;52 and (5) on the
other hand, the Court emphasized that an exclusive competence may
not follow from mere suppositions but requires a “specific analysis,”
which must be both “comprehensive and detailed,”53 of the
relationship between the agreement and the EU rules concerned.
What mattered, at the end of the day, was to ensure that the
agreement was “not capable of undermining the uniform and
consistent application of the Community rules and the proper
functioning of the system which they establish.” Opinion 1/03 can be
said to have implied a certain return to the general approach of the
initial AETR/ERTA judgment viewed in combination with certain
dicta, notably the “to a large extent” criterion, of Opinion 2/91. The
new provision in TFEU Article 3(2) is also based on a fairly broad
understanding of this principle. Reference is made here to not only
situations where the conclusion of an agreement “is provided for in a
legislative act of the Union”—one of the three situations mentioned in
Opinion 1/94—or the so-called 1/76 criterion—which will not be
further explored in this context54—but also situations where the
conclusion of the agreement “may affect common rules or alter their
scope.” The need for “complete harmonization” of the area by EU
legislation is not mentioned.
In an infringement case brought in 2007, that is, before the entry
into force of the TFEU, the Commission argued that a Member State,
by submitting to the International Maritime Organization a proposal
for the monitoring of ships and port facilities, acted in contravention
of the European Union’s exclusive competence, following from a
regulation on enhancing ship and port facility security.55 The Court
agreed, and the Member State was condemned for having failed to
fulfil its obligations under EU law.56 By reference to the
AETR/ERTA judgment, the Court observed that the Member State
51. Id. ¶ 126.
52. Id. ¶ 129.
53. Id. ¶¶ 124, 133.
54. See supra, notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
55. Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31
March 2004, 2004 O.J. L 129/6.
56. Case C-45/07, Comm’n v. Greece, [2009] E.C.R. I-701.
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had set in motion a procedure which could have led—although it had
not actually led—to the adoption of new international rules in a field
covered by the Regulation in question and had thus taken an initiative
“likely to affect the provisions of the Regulation.”57
That the dicta of Opinions 2/91 and 1/03 continue to be relevant
in a post-Lisbon context also has been confirmed in recent case law.
In a case brought by the European Commission against the Council,
the Commission asked for the annulment of a decision taken by the
Council and the representatives of the governments of the Member
States, by which the Commission was denied authorization to
negotiate the entire future Council of Europe Convention on the
protection of neighbouring rights of broadcasting organisations, the
decision being based on the assumption that the agreement envisaged
belonged to the sphere of shared competence.58 The Court agreed with
the Commission and concluded, in annulling the contested decision,
that the negotiations to be held “f[e]ll within the exclusive
competence of the Union.”
This conclusion was grounded in a reaffirmation of the “covered
to a large extent” formula following from Opinions 2/91 and 1/03 and
was reached after a “specific analysis” of the relationship between the
agreement envisaged and the EU legislation in question, as required
by Opinion 1/03. The judgment thus confirms the relevance of the
earlier case law for an application and interpretation of the
AETR/ERTA criterion of Article TFEU 3(2). In referring to a
possible “risk that common EU rules might be adversely affected by
international commitments, or that the scope of those rules might be
altered,”59 the judgment seems to be based on a fairly broad
interpretation of the AETR/ERTA principle. The Court in any case
firmly rejected the view put forward by some Member States arguing
that since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the exclusive
external competence of the European Union should be viewed in a
more restrictive way.60
In this case, the Court also clarified an issue which in most other
decisions of the Court relating to the AETR/ERTA principle have
been tackled only implicitly: What is the “area” of legal regulation to
be considered when it has to be decided whether EU legislation
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ¶ 23.
Comm’n v. Council, Case C-114/12, EU:C:2014:2151.
Id. ¶ 68.
Id. ¶¶ 82-73.
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covers something “to a large extent” and according to which criteria
should this “area” be determined? This question became of particular
significance in the case in question as the Advocate General of the
Court had split the international agreement relating to the rights of
broadcasting organisations into different “parts,” holding that in order
to establish an exclusive competence for the entire international
agreement to be negotiated, it is necessary that “each and every part”
of that agreement be covered by EU rules.61 On this basis, and on the
basis of quite a detailed analysis of some specific questions—such as
the right of retransmission, as distinct from the notions of fixation,
reproduction, distribution and making available to the public, and the
right of protection of pre-broadcast programme-carrying signals—she
concluded that the Commission had not been able to establish that
“each and every part” of the agreement belonged to the sphere of
exclusive competence—partly because some EU rules seemed to
establish minimum requirements only. The European Union thus did
not have an exclusive competence to negotiate the entire agreement,
despite the fact that, according to the Advocate General, it was
“undoubtedly true that EU law covers a considerable part of what
falls to be negotiated.”62
The Court did not subscribe to such a piecemeal approach. By
reference to applicable EU legislation, it observed that the
neighbouring rights of broadcasting organisations are the subject of a
“harmonized legal framework” which has established a regime with
high, homogenous protection for broadcasting organisations. As the
negotiations to be conducted aimed at an international treaty relating
to the same subject-matter—the protection of neighbouring rights of
broadcasting organisations—that was the relevant area for the
purposes of the AETR-ERTA-based analysis, and as that area was
covered “to a large extent” by EU rules, the competence became
exclusive for the entire agreement. It was in this regard immaterial
whether the harmonized legal framework in question had been
established by various legal instruments—as was the case here63—or
not.
The Court also referred to a previous judgment relating to the
environment, where “the protection of waters against pollution,”
61. Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston of Apr. 3, 2014, Comm’n v. Council, supra
note 58, ¶¶ 111, 143-45, 166.
62. Id. ¶ 145.
63. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 58, ¶¶ 78-84.
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which was the subject-matter of the international agreement in
question, was considered as the “area” which had to be taken into
account.64 In other contexts as well the Court has considered a legal
regime or framework as a whole rather than determining the nature of
the European Union’s competence separately for each and every
concrete question;65 on the other hand, the Court has not always
limited its analysis to an entire agreement to be negotiated or
concluded, but has in some cases provided different answers to
different parts of an agreement in so far as these parts have been
clearly distinguishable from each other.66
The Court’s approach seems nevertheless to be based on the
consideration that an international agreement normally forms a whole,
where everything may have an impact on everything, and that
splitting this whole up into small parts would be foreign to the reality
of international treaty negotiations. This could also have as an effect
that there were practically no treaty negotiations which would any
longer be entirely covered by an exclusive competence—as there
would almost always be some question which has not yet been fully
covered by existing EU legislation; such an approach would also
render the “to a large extent” criterion close to meaningless.
Finally, the judgment clarifies the scope of the exception for
“minimum requirements” which had been formulated in Opinion
2/91—and reiterated in some later decisions. With regard to the right
of “retransmission,” some Member States had argued that as the
internal EU rules referred only to retransmission by wireless means,
these rules constituted a minimum harmonization only, and thus the
international agreement could freely extend the concept of
retransmission to retransmission by wire, including the internet. The
64. Id. ¶ 83. The reference was to Commission v. France, Case C-239/03,
EU:C:2004:598 (although in this case, the Court was only called upon to decide whether a
given question fell under a Union competence and not whether that competence was exclusive
or shared).
65. See, e.g., Opinion 1/03, supra note 48, where the Court first distinguished between
the jurisdiction of (national) courts and the recognition and enforcement of their judgments
under Regulation 44/2001 but then observed that these two issues “are closely linked” (at ¶
163) and that the relevant Community rules on the recognition and enforcement of judgments
“are indissociable from those on the jurisdiction of courts, with which them form a unified and
coherent system” (at ¶ 172).
66. For instance, in Opinion 1/94, supra note 24, ¶¶ 43-53, the Court with regard to
GATS made a distinction between the cross-frontier supply of services not involving any
movement of persons and other services as well as between transport services and other
services. See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42.
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Court disagreed, pointing out that the scope of the right of
retransmission under the EU rules did not concern a situation
comparable to that stated in Opinion 2/91, in which both the EU rules
and the international agreement had laid down minimum
requirements.67 The material scope of the right of retransmission as
circumscribed in the EU Directive in question would have been
altered if the international agreement came to extend that right to
retransmission by wire.68 The definition of a basic concept is in other
words not a minimum requirement but a limitation of the scope of the
concept which will inevitably be altered if the international agreement
foresees another definition—it should be recalled in this context that
the international agreement, too, would become an integral part of EU
law and it would even prevail over internal secondary law.69
Soon—roughly one month—after this judgment the ECJ gave an
opinion on the extent of the respective powers of the European Union
and its Member States to declare the acceptance of the accession of
third states to the 1980 Hague Convention on the civil aspects of
international child abduction.70 This Convention provides for an
exceptional procedure whereby an accession to it will have effect only
as regards the bilateral relations between the acceding state and a
contracting party which has declared its acceptance thereof. Whilst
the European Union cannot become a contracting party—as the
Convention is open to “states” only—the Commission had proposed
Council decisions authorizing Member States to give declarations of
acceptance, “in the interest of the EU,” of the accession of eight third
states to the Convention. The Commission argued that such a Council
authorization71 was necessary in view of the fact that the international
abduction of children had become part of an exclusive competence of
the European Union, given Regulation No. 2201/2003 concerning
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility.72

67. See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42, ¶ 18.
68. Comm’n v. Council, supra note 58, ¶¶ 90-92.
69. See, e.g., ROSAS & ARMATI, supra note 1, 59-61.
70. Opinion 1/13, Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
EU:C:2014:2303.
71. On the mechanism of Council authorization, “in the interest of the EU,” of Member
State action in the field of EU exclusive competence, see ROSAS, supra note 6, at 1331-35;
Rosas, supra note 7, at 32-33.
72. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of Nov. 27, 2003, 2003 O.J. L 338/1.
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Opinion 1/13 first of all confirmed earlier case law, including in
particular the “cover to a large extent” criterion, which in conjunction
with the judgment relating to the Council of Europe convention on
rights of broadcasting organizations was said to persist also with
TFEU Article 3(2).73 Then, after having established that the
provisions of the Regulation “cover to a large extent” the two
procedures governed by the 1980 Hague Convention, namely the
procedure concerning the return of wrongfully abducted children and
the procedure for securing the exercise of access rights, the Court
went on to consider whether there was a “risk” that common EU rules
may be affected. In this regard, Regulation 2201/2003 contained less
elements of an obvious relevance for relations with third countries
than Regulation 44/2001 relating to jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which
was dealt with in Opinion 1/03.74 The Court nevertheless observed
that there was an overlap and close connection between the provisions
of Regulation 2201/2003 and those of the Convention and that the
provisions of the latter “may have an effect on the meaning, scope
and effectiveness” of the rules laid down in the former. The Court
moreover referred to the specific situation which could arise when
one Member State acting individually would accept the accession to
the Convention of a third state whilst another Member State would
not. In a concrete situation involving at the same time a third state and
these two Member States, there would be a “risk of undermining the
uniform and consistent application of Regulation No 2201/2003 and,
in particular, the rules concerning cooperation between the authorities
of the Member States.”75
One is left with the impression that particularly with this
decision, the threshold for concluding an AETR/ERTA effect is not
very high. It is noteworthy that the Court in several instances refers to
a “risk” of affectation. That, in itself, is fully in line with the wording
of TFEU Article 3(2), which provides for an exclusive competence in
so far as the conclusion of an international agreement “may affect”
common rules or alter their scope. It is arguable, on the other hand,
that some of the older decisions, and perhaps Opinion 1/94 in
particular, were based on a somewhat more restrictive view of the
scope of the AETR/ERTA principle.
73. Opinion 1/13, supra note 70, ¶ 73.
74. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
75. Opinion 1/13, supra note 70, ¶ 89.
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The story does not end here, however. About one month after
having given its Opinion 1/13, the Court gave a preliminary ruling76
on some questions put to it by an Italian court.77 The national judge
wanted to know whether, having regard to an EU directive on the
promotion of electricity produced from renewable energy sources in
the internal electricity market,78 the European Union had exclusive
external competence that precluded a provision of Italian law, which
provided for an exemption to acquire green certificates in case of
electricity imports from a third state on the basis of a bilateral
agreement between Italy and the third state (Switzerland), under
which the electricity imported was guaranteed to be green. As under
the national legislation that exemption was conditional on the
conclusion, between Italy and the third state, of an international
agreement on mutual recognition of electricity as being produced
from renewable sources, it became important to know whether such a
system was compatible with EU external competences in this field.
The Court, by observing that the question concerned the
applicability of the AETR/ERTA principle, confirmed that this
principle is relevant also in the context of the protection of the
environment, despite the fact that TFEU Article 4 (2) lists the
“environment” among the shared competences and that the Directive
in question has been adopted on the basis of the then Article 175 of
the EC Treaty (now TFEU Article 192).79 This is in line with a
Declaration adopted already in the context of the Treaty of Maastricht
of 1992, according to which the references in the EC Treaty to a
shared competence, inter alia, in the field of the environment (then
Article 130) “do not affect the principles resulting from the judgment
handed down by the Court of Justice in the AETR case.”80
The Court held that the European Union had acquired an
exclusive competence to conclude agreements of the nature envisaged
under the Italian legislation to be concluded by Italy. This conclusion
was basically grounded in three different considerations. First of all,
76. See, e.g., Allan Rosas, The National Judge as EU Judge: Some Constitutional
Observations, 67 SMU L. REV. 717 (2014) (on the preliminary ruling procedure based on
TFEU Article 267).
77. Green Network, Case C-66/13, EU:C:2014.
78. Directive 2001/77/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Sept. 27,
2001, (2001) O.J. L 283, 33.
79. Green Network, supra note 77, ¶¶ 35-36.
80. Declaration on Article 109, 130r and 130y of the Treaty establishing the European
Community, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. C 191/1.
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the purpose of a certain provision of the EU Directive was to
harmonize the conditions on, and mechanisms under, which
electricity could and must be certified in the EU as being green
electricity. As the effect of the envisaged bilateral agreement could
have been to extend the scope of this harmonized mechanism, by
allowing guarantees of origin issued in third states to enjoy a status
equivalent to that enjoyed by guarantees of origin issued in the
Member States, such an agreement was liable to “alter the scope” of
the common rules laid down in the Directive.81 Second, a bilateral
agreement, by making it possible, in the operation of a national
support scheme, to take into account also the green nature of
electricity produced in a third state, could interfere with the objectives
of the Directive and the obligation of the EU Member States to
increase their national production of green electricity. The conclusion
of such agreements was therefore “liable to affect the proper
functioning of the system established by [the D]irective.”82 Thirdly,
the judgment recalls that according to the case law,83 in assessing
whether an area is already “largely covered” by EU rules, account
should be taken not only of EU law as it stands but also “its future
development, in so far as that is foreseeable at the time of [the]
analysis.”84 In this regard, the Court observed that whilst the Directive
in question did not lay down a Community-wide support scheme for
electricity produced from renewable sources, the Commission was
requested to present a report accompanied, if necessary, by a proposal
for a Community framework for the national support schemes, and
that the Italian legislation was adopted during the period in which the
Commission was required to examine this question. The Court also
mentioned that a new Directive of 2009,85 which had replaced the
previous Directive of 2001, referred to the need to specify the
conditions under which green electricity produced in a third state
could be taken into account by a Member States in order to achieve
the binding target on green energy imposed on it by the new
81. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶¶ 41-49.
82. Id. ¶¶ 50-60.
83. Id. ¶¶ 33, 61; See Opinion 2/91, supra note 42, ¶ 25; Opinion 1/03, supra note 48, ¶
126; Comm’n v. Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Sept. 4, 2014), ¶ 74; Opinion 1/13,
supra note 70, ¶ 74.
84. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶ 61.
85. Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 23,
2009 on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and
Subsequently Repealing Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC, 2009 O.J. L 140/16.
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Directive.86 This seems to be the first time that the Court makes
concrete use of the criterion of “future development” as one element
pointing at the existence of exclusive competence in a given area.87
CONCLUSION
By its AETR/ERTA judgment of 1971 and Opinion 1/75, the
ECJ provided an important platform for the existence not only of a
competence to conclude international agreements in the name of the
European Union, but also of an exclusive competence in this regard.
Subsequent case law relating to the common commercial policy
introduced some important limits to this concept. According to
Opinion 1/94 the trade in services and the trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights fell largely outside an exclusive
competence;88 and according to some later Court decisions, even
measures affecting the trade in goods could fall outside the common
commercial policy if the measures were deemed to pursue
predominantly objectives other than the promotion of trade as such,
such as the protection of the environment.89
The AETR/ERTA principle, too, became circumscribed by dicta
making a reserve for EU legislation providing for minimum
requirements only (Opinion 2/91) and referring to the need for
“complete harmonization” as one ground for an exclusive
AETR/ERTA competence (Opinion 1/94). Opinion 2/91, it is true,
also introduced the “to a large extent” criterion and made reference to
the future development of EU law as a possible element to be taken
into account, but with the exception of the Open Skies judgments,90 in
which a limited external competence was confirmed, there were no
cases in which the ECJ determined the existence of an AETR/ERTA
exclusive competence.91
The scope of the common commercial policy was considerably
enlarged by the Treaty of Lisbon and the new definition given in
TFEU Article 207. The judgment in Daiichi Sankyo of 2013 confirms
86. Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Nov. 26, 2014), ¶¶ 63-64.
87. Id.
88. Opinion 1/94, supra note 24.
89. See Opinion 2/00, supra note 27; see also Comm’n v. Council, [2006] E.C.R. I-1;
Comm’n v. Parliament and Council, [2006] E.C.R. I-7585.
90. See Comm’n v. Denmark, [2002] E.C.R. I-9519, ¶ 84.
91. In Opinion 2/92, supra note 38, ¶¶ 25, 31-34, an AETR/ERTA competence was
denied.
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that the whole area of TRIPS falls under Article 207,92 and there is
every reason to believe that the same conclusion would apply to the
trade in services and GATS.93 There are, on the other hand, some
issues which remain to be clarified in later case law, such as the exact
scope of the notions of “commercial aspects” of intellectual property
outside the TRIPS framework and of “foreign direct investment,”
both appearing in TFEU Article 207.
With Opinion 1/03,94 as well as the new rule in TFEU Article
3(2), the AETR/ERTA principle has experienced somewhat of a
renaissance. Not only in Opinion 1/03, but also in an infringement
case of 2009 and in three judgments given in 2014, the ECJ has
confirmed the existence of an AETR/ERTA-based exclusive
competence.95 It is too early to predict all the consequences Article
3(2) and this new case law may have for the application of the
AETR/ERTA principle in general. What seems undeniable, however,
is that in the light of this case law, the principle will play an important
role in judging the nature of EU external competences. What is
noticeable, in particular, is the Court’s focus, in determining whether
there is coverage “to a large extent,” on a given legal regime rather
than each and every detail of this regime, the limitation of the reserve
for “minimum requirements” to situations where it is clear that both
the EU internal rules and the international agreements provide for
such requirements only, and the inclusion of future foreseeable legal
developments in the elements to be taken into account when deciding
whether EU rules may be affected or not. The general but at the same
time ultimate criterion formulated in Opinion 1/03 and in subsequent
case law, namely the need to ensure that the agreement is “not
capable of undermining the uniform and consistent application of the
Community rules and the proper functioning of the system which they
establish,” calls for an overall assessment, adjusted to the
particularities of each case, rather than a strict fixation on this or that
more detailed criterion.
With the by now extensive, and it seems, ever expanding, EU
legislation in areas such as the environment, transport, judicial
92. See Daiichi Sankyo, [2013] E.C.R I___ (delivered July 18, 2013), ¶¶ 52, 54-55.
93. See also Comm’n v. Council, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Oct. 22, 2013).
94. Supra note 48, and accompanying text.
95. Comm’n v. Greece, [2009] E.C.R. I-701; Comm’n v. Council, [2014] E.C.R. I___
(delivered Sept. 4, 2014); Opinion 1/13, supra note 70; Green Network, [2014] E.C.R. I___
(delivered Nov. 26, 2014).
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cooperation in civil matters, and the status of third-country nationals
and asylum-seekers, there is a potential for a broad rather than narrow
application of the AETR/ERTA principle, including with respect to
bilateral agreements between the European Union and third
countries.96 The last chapter on the scope of exclusive external
competence is far from having been written.

96. Important bilateral agreements such as association agreements have also recently
been concluded as mixed agreements. See Rosas, supra note 7, at 24-25.

